



The Treaty of Lisbon enters into force: consequences for Polish and European development policy

The genesis and principal provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon

After the population of Ireland agreed to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in a second referendum, hopes for this treaty's rapid entry into force were high. Following Ireland's footsteps, Poland also finalised the ratification process. The Czech Republic became the last country to sign the international treaty and, as a result, all 27 European Union member states have now successfully finalised the ratification process. Consequently, the Lisbon Treaty has become binding on 1 December 2009.¹ Its entry into force is an apt occasion to take a closer look at the changes that the Treaty may introduce to the European Union's relations with developing countries, who are the beneficiaries of development aid, and to the planning and realisation mechanisms of European development policy.

The "Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community" (as the treaty is officially titled) is the result of a long and stormy (even by EU standards) negotiation process, which has passed through several key stages: the establishment of the European Convention to develop the European Constitution project, the drafting of the document itself, its rejection in referenda in France and the Netherlands, its subsequent modification ("deconstitutionalisation of the constitution"), the adoption of a new treaty by the Council of the European Union in Lisbon on 13 December 2007, and finally its long and complex ratification process.

For the European Union as a whole, the Lisbon Treaty introduces a range of modifications to the system that had been in place until now. In the most succinct terms, these changes will:

- Transform the Union into a homogenous international organisation endowed with a legal entity. This implies the abolition of the tripartite EU structure, although the EURATOM remains wholly separate;

- Specify and clarify the scope of competence areas entrusted to the EU and the delineation of competences belonging to the EU and its member states;
- Endorse the EU Council's decision-making rule of qualified majority, according to the double majority principle;
- Underline the specificity of the Common Foreign and Security Policy;
- Strengthen the role national parliaments, especially relative to control over the application of the principle of subsidiarity;
- Strengthen the protection of fundamental rights by codifying the Charter of Fundamental Rights and create a legal basis for the EU's accession (as an international organisation) to the European Convention on Human Rights;
- Increase flexibility of action within the Union, for example through new regulations for "enhanced cooperation", and increase the number of areas in which the codecision procedure will be applied;
- Conduct reforms of important institutions, such as granting institutional status to the European Council, the creation of the offices of the President of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the abolition of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) and the establishment of two separate councils (General Affairs Council, Foreign Affairs Council), and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS);
- Implement new procedures for the revision of European Union constitutional treaties².

Treaty of Lisbon provisions pivotal for EU external relations

The most important of the Lisbon Treaty provisions, outlined above, will have a significant impact on the Union's overall functioning in all the areas of its activity. From the point of view of the EU's role and importance on the world stage, and in particular its role in resolving the problems of global development, several of the key provisions deserve particular attention.

The Lisbon Treaty distinctly places development cooperation policy within what is broadly understood as the European Union's "external action". Aside from development cooperation, external action also encompasses common trade policy, economic-financial-technological cooperation with third countries, humanitarian aid, and EU relations with international organisations. In these areas of action – in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty's amendment of Art. 21 of the consolidated Treaty on European Union (TEU) – the Union has committed to follow the guiding principles of the EU's establishment, development, and growth, which it aims to promote in the international arena. In this context, the Treaty mentions democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of justice and solidarity, and respect for the principles outlined in the United Nations Charter and enshrined in international law. The Treaty also stipulates that in its external action the EU will strive to:

- Protect its values, fundamental interests, security, independence, and integrity;
- Strengthen and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the principles of international law;
- Preserve peace, prevent conflicts, and strengthen international security according to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the aims of the Paris Charter, including the aims and principles concerned with external borders;
- Support sustainable economic and social development, and natural environment protection in developing countries with the overriding aim of eliminating poverty;
- Encourage all countries to integrate the world economy through, among other measures, the gradual abolition of international trade barriers;
- Help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment

and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development;

- Assist populations, countries and regions facing natural or man-made disasters;
- Promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance³.

The placing of development policy within the broader range of EU foreign relations, while at the same time including the elimination of poverty among the aims of EU external action, carries both risks and opportunities.

On the one hand, it is possible that the development of Global South countries and the fight against poverty will be more than ever subordinate to theoretically more important goals, such as trade or security policies.

On the other hand, the treaty provisions may produce greater coherence between all areas of EU external action and the fundamental aim of the EU development policy, given that upon the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty the reduction of poverty will have to be a part of overall EU external action. This goal will affect not only the EU development policy, but, for the first time, will be counted as one of the aims of the EU overall policy in the international arena. In the opinion of certain experts, the treaty will contribute to the development of the „whole-of-government“ approach to development issues, the first expression of which (preceding the enactment of the Treaty) was the EU Strategy for Africa.

Such an approach should also contribute to the more adequate allocation of EU financial resources towards emerging challenges, such as climate change⁴.

As mentioned above, the Lisbon Treaty granted the European Council institutional status and established the office of the President of the Council, who will oversee Council meetings and ensure the preparation and continuity of the Council's work. It is difficult to judge, at present, how great an influence the President will have on EU activities in the international arena: to what degree will the office become one of a quasi-President of the EU with whom world leaders will consult on matters of global importance, or whether it will rather be that of a secretariat coordinating the work of national leaders and governments. There are many signs that the latter option will prevail. However – because of a lack of specific Treaty provisions – the personality and negotiating skills of the first President may yet prove decisive in determining the office's standing.

The Treaty of Lisbon also established the office of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs

and Security Policy, who will consolidate the functions of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Commissioner for External Relations, and become, at the same time, vice-President of the European Commission. Thus, the positions occupied by J. Solana and B. Ferrero-Waldner will be eliminated. The High Representative's main task will be to coordinate and oversee the coherence of EU external action. The High Representative will represent the EU abroad, coordinate all of EU external action (including development policy) and preside over Foreign Affairs Council meetings. It remains an open question as to whom the High Representative will de facto be subordinate to – the Council, or the President of the European Commission – and how the High Representative will proceed when faced with conflicting instructions from the two.

The Lisbon Treaty stipulates that EU external relations will be handled by two newly created Councils: the General Affairs Council and the Foreign Affairs Council. The latter will be presided by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy while the General Affairs Council, just as all other Council compositions, is to be presided by a representative of the country carrying out the Presidency. The primary task of the General Affairs Council is to prepare all European Council summits, while the focus of the Foreign Affairs Council will be on the EU's broadly defined external relations.

The Treaty also enacts the European External Action Service, which will act as the European Union's diplomatic service, and which will be subject to the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Its duties will consist in offering support to the High Representative in carrying out the tasks of the office. The Service will act in cooperation with the diplomatic services of Member States and will be composed of functionaries of the EU Council and Commission Secretariats as well as diplomats delegated by the Foreign Affairs ministries of Member States. European Commission delegations in third countries and Council Representations (e.g. at the UN's New York headquarters) will become EU delegations and will acquire the status of legal entities, which will give them the possibility to represent the EU in third countries and in international organisations. These functions will be exercised by EU ambassadors.

The Treaty of Lisbon has also introduced certain modifications to specific areas of EU activity, including those that concern international issues. In the field of environment protection policy, the Treaty includes clear

provisions for the fight against the effects of climate change. Significant changes have also been made to the EU's budget regulations: long-term budgets must plan for at least five years, financial perspectives must be adopted – in principle – unanimously by the European Council, with the possibility of transferring certain competences to the EU Council (which will be able to make necessary decisions on the basis of qualified majority), while the distinction between obligatory and non-obligatory spending has been eliminated⁵.

By acquiring the status of a legal entity the European Union gained the ability to conclude agreements with third countries and international institutions, that contribute to the realisation of the aims of EU external action, as defined in Article 21 of the consolidated Treaty on European Union.

The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon: consequences for EU development policy

The Lisbon Treaty (in Art. 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – TFEU⁶) introduces one goal of EU development policy into EU primary law. This goal is the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty⁷. Until now the aim of the European Community (Union)⁸ was sustainable economic and social development, as well as the smooth integration of developing countries into the world economy. In the opinion of some, this has helped development policy to achieve the status of a full-fledged EU policy⁹. It has been pointed out above that, according to the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, EU development policy will be conducted within the scope, and according to the rules and aims of, EU external relations – consequently, it will acquire a political dimension.

Significant as well are the changes that the Treaty of Lisbon makes to provisions related to the complementarity and coordination of EU development policy. In accordance with previous treaty provisions, complementarity was one-sided, that is: the development policy of the Community was meant to complement the development policies of member states. According to the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon (Art. 208 TFEU), however, the "Union's development cooperation policy and that of the Member States complement and reinforce each other". In this context, it is worth noting that in terms of shared competences, Art. 2 of TFEU explains that Member States "shall exercise

their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence” and that if the Union decides to cease exercising its competence, the Member States will again exercise their competence to the relevant extent⁴. Simultaneously, the new Art. 210 of the TFUE stipulates that “to promote the complementarity and efficiency of their action, the Union and the Member States shall coordinate their policies on development cooperation and shall consult each other on their aid programmes, including in international organisations and during international conferences...”. This type of reinforcement of treaty provisions may have a beneficial effect on the further harmonisation of development cooperation policies between the EU and its Member States.

It is difficult to unequivocally evaluate the influence that the Treaty will have on policy coherence for development with other EU policies. On the one hand – as mentioned above – the fight against poverty has been given added weight in overall EU external action. On the other, the treaty provisions related to the coherence of development cooperation policy have themselves remained unchanged. According to Art. 208 TFUE, the EU “shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries”. These provisions do not specify whether they refer to all EU policies (including “internal” policies that nevertheless significantly influence Global South countries, for example, the Common Agricultural Policy), or only external policies (such as trade and immigration, among others), but given the spirit of the Treaty, we may lean towards the broader interpretation. At the same time, it is quite likely that one of the effects of the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon will be a stronger insistence on the part of the Union on the promotion of trade liberalisation. This implies that one of the underlying goals of EU external action will be to support the integration of all countries into the world economy through, for example, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade. However, increasing the number of issues on which the European Parliament will gain the right of codecision will not necessarily favour Global South countries, because the EP – as the direct reflection of EU societies – will rather support the interests of the Community and may to a lesser degree be guided by the needs of the poorer part of the globe. Thus, the inclusion within the codecision procedure of the Common Agricultural policy, for example, may signify increased difficulties for policy reforms that aim to benefit developing countries.

The Treaty of Lisbon also contains provisions on EU humanitarian aid, which – as is the case with development aid – is to be delivered in accordance with the principles and goals of EU external action. The Treaty stipulates that humanitarian aid operations shall be conducted in compliance with the principles of international law and with the principles of impartiality, neutrality and non-discrimination. As is the case with development cooperation, the EU may conclude with third countries and competent international organisations any agreement that fulfils the treaty’s provisions for humanitarian aid. One of the treaty’s most controversial provisions in this area is the creation of a European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps, meant to offer young Europeans the possibility and opportunity of volunteer service in developing countries. This idea received much criticism from within humanitarian aid circles, already during the work of the European Convention, mostly centred on questions about the contribution that unprepared young people would be able to make in conditions that are shaped by increasingly more difficult humanitarian challenges and in operations that require experience and professionalism.

It is also worthwhile to add that the Lisbon Treaty foresees that the Commission may take any useful initiative to promote coordination between actions of the Union and those of the Member States, in order to enhance the efficiency and complementarity of Union and national humanitarian aid measures.

The Lisbon Treaty does not predetermine the details of many institutional issues related to development cooperation and other areas of EU external relations, thus conferring relevant decisions onto the European Council, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the EU Council. For example, it has not been determined whether issues of development in poorer countries will be dealt with by the Foreign Affairs, or the General Affairs, Councils (the same is true of trade and enlargement issues). As for questions of development cooperation, it is more probable that it will be maintained within the purview of Foreign Affairs Council sessions, following the GAERC formula, that is: a distinct part of sessions will be devoted to development issues. In that case the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy would preside over deliberations of ministers (or deputy ministers) responsible for development. It would then fall within the High Representative’s agenda to direct all Council work related to all areas of the Union’s international

activities. Another issue awaiting specification is the question of the work of the Council and its auxiliary organs (such as the Working Party on Development Cooperation – CODEV). It is still unclear who will preside CODEV: a representative of the office of the High Representative, or a representative of the country fulfilling the EU Council presidency. The latter possibility seems more plausible, although in theory we may expect that new regulations on the General Affairs Council and the External Affairs Council will have a “cascading” effect for the Council’s working groups¹¹.

It has not been specified whether areas of activity such as development aid, enlargement, and the Neighbourhood Policy will eventually be included among the competences of the European External Action Service and, if so, what weight will be given by future EU ambassadors to these areas of activity within the overall set of tasks of the new service. There are three likely eventualities. The first, minimalist conception holds that the EEAS would concentrate on the coordination of EU external action, which would essentially mean the unchanged continuation of the present structure of European Commission Representations in third countries. Conversely, a maximally broad conception would see the new European diplomatic service extend its competences to all aspects of EU external relations in all regions of the world. Finally, there is a third option that would consist of some form of middle ground between the two extremes¹². The inclusion of development issues within the range of EEAS competences – as is frequently pointed out – would imply the subordination of EU delegations to the authority of the High Representative and, at the same time, the Commissioner for Development. The situation would, however, provide development aid personnel with additional assistance from the non-aid delegation’s staff but could also lead to a degree of subordination of development aid to the broadly-defined political goals of the EU in developing countries.

It is to be expected that the creation of EEAS and the inclusion of development cooperation within the scope of its competences will contribute to enhance division of labour and complementarity in the field of development aid in accordance with the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy,

adopted in 2007¹³. Strengthened EU delegations would surely be better prepared to assume the functions of managing the development aid flowing from a Member State to a country of accreditation, than are the smaller European Commission delegations in their present form. The strengthening of EU delegations in developing countries, in the context of the present-level, or even reduced, resources of Member State embassies, would enhance the delegations’ role in the EU development aid delivery system. It would also strengthen the position of the European Commission within the EU aid system, assuming that the scope of the process of complementarity and division of labour is extended worldwide.

Such developments would signify that new EU delegations are natural leaders in the field of joint planning and, given time, also in the joint implementation of aid programmes for countries of accreditation independently of other factors, such as the relative importance of member state embassies or the positions of local governments. We can assume, as well, that the creation of EU delegations strengthened by the EEAS will contribute to the further decentralisation of EU development aid, that is, to the increased delegation of tasks and human resources from the Brussels centre towards EU delegations in third countries.

There are fears that due to the planned reduction of the number of commissioners from 27 to 18, beginning in 2014, the independent post of Commissioner for Development will be eliminated and development cooperation issues will be transferred into the scope of competences of the commissioner responsible for EU external relations being at the same time the High Representative. There are also apprehensions that a Commissioner for Development subject to the authority of the High Representative will become a de facto “junior commissioner”. This is a real danger, especially given that the Lisbon Treaty favours the coherence of EU external action and gives its external relations a distinct set of aims, as outlined above. For these reasons – if the post of Commissioner for Development remains in effect – the keys to the Commissioner’s efficient execution of relevant tasks will be the post’s scope of competences and relations with the High Representative. As is the case with other commissioners concerned with EU external relations (e.g. Commissioner for Trade), the Commissioner for Development will be subject to coordination from the part of the High Representative

to some degree, although the breadth of this coordination has not yet been specified.

These issues are closely linked to the future internal organisation of the European Commission. Until now, the organisation has been such that the programming of development aid destined for African, Caribbean, and Pacific states (ACP) was overseen by the Directorate General for Development (DG DEV), while programming of aid destined for Asia, Latin America, the Near East, South Africa, and EU-neighbour countries lay within the competence of the Directorate General for External Relations (DG RELEX). Finally, the implementation of development aid in all these regions is conducted by the EuropeAid Cooperation Office, established in 2001.

These European Commission institutional solutions for development aid management have two distinguishing characteristics. First, development policy is elaborated by two separate directorates general, each under the authority of distinct European Commission members. Second, the solutions represent the institutional separation of policy planning and policy implementation. While the latter solution is successfully applied in the aid systems of a significant proportion of bilateral donors (e.g. Sweden, Austria), and in others' it would be desirable (as in the case of Poland), the first solution is quite unusual. Certainly, the identification of the DG DEV with ACP countries seems decidedly outdated at present¹⁴, and the elaboration of the Community's development policy by two mutually independent Commissioners and two separate directorates general does not favour the coherent elaboration of the EU's aid agenda. Moreover, the system weakens the field of development in relation to the overall set of issues with which the European Commission is concerned, since development is not the chief task of the "powerful" Commissioner for External relations, but is, rather, promoted only by the relatively "weak" Commissioner for Development.

For the above reasons, it would be advantageous for the commissioner responsible for development and humanitarian aid to have jurisdiction over all aid resources (fulfilling the criteria of Official Development Assistance - ODA) that are at the disposal of the European Commission and that are destined to all regions of the world, including the EU's neighbours.

This would be made possible through the creation of a new directorate general and the extension of its competences to tasks related to the elaboration of aid policies, which are presently formulated by the Directorate General for External Relations (DG RELEX) and the Directorate General for Development (DG DEV). The new directorate general would come under the authority of one Commissioner for Development, who would also oversee the EuropeAid Cooperation Office. In this way, the totality of development aid distributed by the Community would be overseen by one member of the European Commission, maintaining a rational institutional division in the planning and implementation of development aid. Additionally, the position of the Commissioner for Development would be strengthened relative to the other college members, which would do much to erase any lingering doubts over the relevance of a distinct post for international development issues within the European Commission. A flaw in this vision is the separation of development issues from other aspects of EU relations with the Global South (such as security or migration policy), which would not be favourable to the policy coherence for development. However, this problem may be solved by the role of the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in coordinating all of EU external action. In the event, the task of the High Representative would primarily be to ensure that a coherent set of appropriate instruments (political, aid, or security) is employed by the Union in relation to each country and world region.

The influence of the Treaty of Lisbon on the EU Council Presidency

Finally, it is certainly worthwhile to devote a few words to the consequences that the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty will have on the ways in which the EU Council presidency is carried out, especially in the context of Poland's first mandate in that post, to be fulfilled in the second half of 2011. Those consequences must be seen as significant. Broadly speaking, the permanent post of the President of the European Council will replace the rotational presidency. This means that, rather than the head of Poland's government, it is the President of the Council who will be first and foremost responsible for negotiations at the level of the European council and final

shape of the Presidency Conclusions. Therefore, Poland's presidency will not extend to the European Council level. Neither will it influence the Foreign Affairs Council, since under the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty its work and that of foreign affairs ministers will be directed by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. However, the Presidency will retain a key role in the matters of the newly established General Affairs Council and the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER). In external affairs, it is possible that the role of the Presidency will be limited largely to protocol functions, while the role of the Brussels decision-centre will be strengthened¹⁵.

A significant new organisational aspect is the implementation of the 18-month, collective three-state Presidency in the EU Council. The rotational Presidency will play a significant role in all the Council's formations (with the exception of the Foreign Affairs Council). The establishment of a joint Presidency signifies that, over 18-month terms, three member states (Trio) carry out the Presidency according to a joint programme in a system of mutual support, that is: during a given country's 6-month portion of the Trio's mandate, that country leads proceedings, while its Trio partners support it in carrying out that task. The implication is that each Trio member's influence over the Presidency *de facto* extends beyond the 6-month mandate over which each presides. There is also the possibility that Trio members may decide on alternative division of labour solutions during their 18-month joint term¹⁶. Under Lisbon Treaty governments, we are likely to see a (more or less overt) elimination of the tradition that saw incoming administrations present their priorities at the beginning of their term¹⁷.

Assessment of the Lisbon Treaty's influence on European development policy

Many supporters of the Lisbon Treaty have expressed the hope that it will facilitate the international promotion and implementation of the values of peace, security, and prosperity, which so far have acted as the driving forces for integration within the European Union. This chiefly refers to the EU's activities in the field

of sustainable development support, as well as aid for poorer countries and the Global South.

Undoubtedly, the authors of the Lisbon Treaty did not seize all available opportunities to introduce elements that are significant for contemporary global and European development policy. There is a glaring lack of references to the issue of development aid effectiveness and the principles enshrined in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) or the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). Thus, the Treaty does not mention the fundamental principles of contemporary development cooperation, such as: local leadership on development policies and strategies (*ownership*)¹⁸, partnerships with developing countries, and adjusting aid according to partner countries' national development strategies, institutions, and procedures (*alignment*) – even though certain among these principles are included in the EU-ACP Partnership Agreement (Cotonou, 2000) and have been confirmed by the European Consensus on Development¹⁹.

The Treaty does not succeed in augmenting the policy coherence for development, which would have mitigated the frequently negative influence that the Union exerts on Global South countries in a variety of fields. However, a positive assessment can be made of the Treaty's overt promotion of the "whole-of-government" approach and its inclusion of the eradication of poverty among the goals of EU action in the international arena. The coherence between EU action for development and EU external policy, broadly defined, may be enhanced by the creation of the office of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who should be supported in this area by the new, strengthened Commissioner for Development.

The Treaty of Lisbon succeeds in strengthening the provisions related to complementarity, that is, the relationship between the EU aid programme and the individual aid programmes of Member States. At the same time, it is highly probable that placing development cooperation within the competence of the EEAS would strengthen both the role of the European Commission in Union aid management at the local level in developing countries and the role of Community institutions within the overall EU aid system. An increased number of financial resources



will be directed through Union delegations and fewer through Member States' embassies. The European Commission will not act as one among other Union donors, but it will rather move towards being the effective body coordinating overall Union aid for the countries of accreditation.

Conclusions for Poland's development policy and Poland's Presidency of the EU Council in the 2nd half of 2011.

We can assume that the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty will, to a certain degree, change the conditions for the planning and realisation of Poland's development policy. In the briefest terms, the situation may be summed-up as follows:

- As a result of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU will acquire an increased capability to influence world events, supported by the establishment of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service. It is in Poland's interest that this influence be as strong as possible, since it will permit Poland (together with the Union) to defend its interests beyond the regional arena. As well, Poland should support the High Representative's enhanced answerability to the European Commission and increased independence from the Council;
- A careful reading of external action goals as framed in the Treaty, as well as observed practice, both indicate that we should not entertain the illusion that EU external policy will focus on Polish priorities, such as defence issues, the Eastern Partnership, or energy policy. If there is going to be any obvious "triad", it will be the conventional combination of diplomacy, trade, and aid;
- Overall EU development policy will be focussed, more than ever, on poverty reduction in developing countries and it will have at its disposal an enhanced instrumentation that goes beyond traditional development aid tools. This will require Polish Aid to be more directly concerned with fighting poverty on the world scale. There will also be an increased insistence on closer cooperation between EU members in joint aid programming, harmonisation

of procedures, and the collaborative realisation of aid actions in developing countries. By the same token, there will be increased pressure on Poland to move towards trilateral cooperation with other EU members and the European Commission through adequate procedural changes;

- Poland carries sufficient clout to make its voice heard in discussions over the future organisation of the European Commission's aid system and, optimally, introduce its own reform proposal. From the point of view of planning transparency and aid management, the most advantageous tactic for Poland would be the promotion of a strong Commissioner for Development, who oversees both the planning and implementation of aid destined for all regions of the world, and is subject to the coordination of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy;
- If Poland aims to increase its development aid and participate more actively in poverty reduction actions on the world scale, it should support the European External Action Service in extending its competence over development cooperation. With the help of strong EU delegations in field, this will facilitate the delivery of Polish aid to countries with which Poland does not have strong ties and where our embassies, NGOs, enterprises, missionaries are scarce or absent. .
- The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon must be taken into account in the preparations for Poland's EU Council Presidency, since the Treaty has specific implications for the country fulfilling the presidential mandate. In the field of external relations, Poland's presidential role may be restricted by the authority of the High Representative. However, (from the ministerial level up) Poland must prepare to be active and, at least partially, to "preside" over the Union for the duration of the 18-month rotational presidency, cooperating much more closely with its Trio partners (in the event: Denmark and Cyprus) than has been the practice of previous presidencies.

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1. The Lisbon Treaty was to enter into force on 1 January 2009, provided that all ratification documents had been submitted before that date (which turned out not to be the case), or thereafter, on the first day of the month following the submission of the final document.
2. J. Barcz, *Poznaj Traktat z Lizbony*, Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej, Warszawa 2008.
3. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, Official Journal of the European Union, 2007/C 306.
4. A more political EU external action. Implications of the Treaty of Lisbon for the EU's relations with developing countries. InBrief No. 21 – June 2008, ECDPM.
5. J. Barcz, *op.cit.*.
6. Pursuant to the Treaty of Lisbon, the title of the Treaty establishing the European Community has been amended to: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – TFEU.
7. Treaty of Lisbon, *op.cit.*
8. Until now, research literature and editorial opinion have made the distinction (although not always clearly) between the development aid and policy of the European Community (that is, aid actions conducted by the European Commission, drawing chiefly on the EU budget and the European Development Fund) and those of the European Union (that is, aid actions of the Community and the Union's member states). After the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, this distinction may lead to confusion, since the designation "European Union" (at least in relation to principles of development cooperation) has supplanted the designation "European Community".
9. *Whither EC Aid ? WECA Briefing note : the Lisbon Treaty*, ECDPM, Actionaid, Brussels – Johannesburg, 2008.
10. J. Barcz, *op.cit.*
11. A. Missiroli, *What role for the EU rotational Presidency in the Lisbon Treaty „system“*, Draft Paper presented at the 2nd meeting of the Advisory Group, Warsaw 15/16 October 2009.
12. M. Gavas, S. Maxwell, *Options for architectural reform in European Union development cooperation*, Overseas Development Institute Background Note, August 2009.
13. *EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy. Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council*, Council of the European Union, Brussels 2007.
14. *The implications of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty for the EU development cooperation. Report from the Informal Senior Officials Meeting*, ECDPM, Maastricht 2009.
15. www.ukie.gov.pl.
16. *Jaki wpływ na prezydencję będzie miało przyjęcie Traktatu z Lizbony*, www.prezydencjaue.gov.pl.
17. A. Missiroli, *What role for the EU rotational Presidency in the Lisbon Treaty „system“*, Draft Paper presented at the 2nd meeting of the Advisory Group, Warsaw 15/16 October 2009.
18. The essence of this principle is that developing countries elaborate their own conception of long-term development, which then becomes the basis both for administrative government action, and the actions of external development aid donors.
19. *The European Consensus on Development. Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union Development Policy: „The European Consensus“*, 2006/c46/01 w: L. Michel, *Compendium on development cooperation strategies*, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2006.